In this module, we will examine the historical foundations on which the incorporation and exercise clauses are based and examine the legal principles established by the Supreme Court when determining whether a law or government action violates either of the two clauses. In the following modules, we will apply these legal standards to specific legal and factual contexts. In short, when drafting the Constitution, the founders` experience of religious persecution by the English monarchy motivated them to support “the protection and adaptation of religious practice, both individually and collectively.” [17] They hoped that “by protecting religious freedom, they would protect the already religiously diverse country from the types of religious conflicts that had raged in Europe for much of the 16th and 17th centuries.” Following the founders` intentions, the Supreme Court stated that the free clause “prevents state regulation of religious beliefs as such or interference in the spread of religious ideas” and “prohibits the abuse of secular government programs” to impede or negatively discriminate between religions in accordance with one or all religions, even if the burden can only be described as indirect.” [18] In the early years, some religious claimants won and others lost. The Mormon Church lost on a large scale in the first such case to reach the U.S. Supreme Court. Reynolds v. United States (1878). In 1963, the Supreme Court ruled that the First Amendment clause requires the government to make provisions for the practice of religion, which, as always, are subject to restrictions based on the public interest and the rights of others. Sherbert v. Verner (1963). In 1990, the Court took the opposite view in a case concerning the sacramental use of peyote by members of the Native American Church. Employment Division v. Smith (1990).
In 1972, the Court held that a law of general application that is “prima facie neutral” may nevertheless violate the First Amendment if that law “places an undue burden on the practice of religion.” In Wisconsin v. Yoder ruled that the state`s interest in requiring a child to attend compulsory school until the age of 16, while important, could not withstand a claim by members of the Amish religious sect. An Amish family claimed that forcing their children to attend public schools after the age of 14 would expose them to “secular influences” against their traditionalist beliefs and undermine the Amish island community. In yoder, the court held that the purpose of compulsory education was to develop productive and independent citizenship, but that the purpose of the state should be examined in the light of the particular circumstances of the case. Since the Amish had a 200-year tradition of educating their young people to be productive members of their “separate farming” community, the government`s interests could still be realized by requiring education only until the age of 14. This would remove the burden on the right of the Amish community to practice its religion freely, while serving the best interests of the State. In a clear explanation of its doctrine, the Yoder court stated that “all vested interests and those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion.” [1] www.law.cornell.edu/wex/free_exercise_clause The first Supreme Court case to address the issue of free exercise was Reynolds v. United States. (1878), in which the Court upheld a federal law prohibiting polygamy against the objections of Mormons who claimed that the practice was their religious duty. In Reynolds, the Court drew a distinction between religious belief and religious conduct or action, stating that Congress had been “stripped of any legislative power on mere opinion, but had been freed to take actions that violated social duties or were disorderly.” Recognizing religious defense, the court said, “would allow any citizen to become law to himself.” While the government cannot punish citizens for their religious beliefs, it can regulate religion-motivated behavior, provided it has a rational basis for doing so.
This “basic rational test” became the norm for determining whether a law that interfered with religious practice violated the free exercise clause. Because this standard was easy for the government to meet, the courts rejected religious freedom claims against generally applicable laws for nearly a century. Between 1879 and the mid-20th century, the Court ruled on only a handful of cases of free exercise. Nearly 100 years later, the Supreme Court has broadened its interpretation of the clause and what protects it. [3] In 1963, a violated law violated the free exercise clause.[3] The U.S. Supreme Court overturned the state court`s decision. Justice William Brennan wrote that while the court has so far rejected “challenges under the free exercise of certain open acts triggered by religious beliefs and principles,” the conduct or conduct so regulated “invariably constitutes a significant threat to public safety, peace or public order.” Since Sherbert`s “conscientious objection to Saturday work” was not “conduct within the framework of state law,” any law that resulted in a secondary burden on the free exercise of religion must be justified by a “compelling interest of the state in regulating a subject within the regulatory power of the state.” Justice Sandra Day O`Connor, while agreeing with the outcome, strongly opposed the court`s abandonment of the “compelling interest” standard, as did Justice Harry Blackmun in dissent. O`Connor argued that the free exercise clause relieves a burden imposed by the government, whether the burden is imposed directly by laws prohibiting certain religious practices that are clearly unconstitutional, or indirectly by laws that “actually renounce one`s own religion. the price of an equal place in society”. However, if a state regulation targets a religious practice, it will be subject to a very high standard, even if the regulation seems reasonable.
In the church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc.c. City of Hialeah,[9] the city of Hialeah has banned the ritual slaughter of animals within the city limits. The evidence suggested that the law was directed against the religious practice of animal sacrifice in Santeria. Since the law referred to a religion, it could only be authorized if there was a compelling interest of the State that the ordinance required. As reasonable as the prohibition on the ritual slaughter of animals may seem, the State had shown no compelling reason to continue this particular religious practice to the exclusion of other slaughter of animals to the exclusion of other slaughter of animals. As a result, the regulation was removed in violation of the free exercise clause of the First Amendment. In the 1960s and early 1970s, the Court amended and strengthened protections for religious conduct by interpreting the free exercise clause to protect the right of religious believers to be exempted from generally applicable laws that weigh on the practice of religion. The Court held that the government cannot enforce even a religiously neutral law that generally applies to all or most of society, unless the public interest in enforcing the law is “mandatory.” Wisconsin vs. Yoder (1972). Yoder therefore argued that Amish families could not be punished for refusing to send their children to school beyond the age of 14. Only a few years before the first Amendment was ratified, James Madison wrote that all human beings inherently retained “the same right to the free exercise of religion according to the commandments of conscience” without the government “exposing certain special burdens” or “granting other special exceptions.” A monument and a remonstrance against religious evaluations (1785).
As Madison suggested, at the time the Constitution and Bill of Rights were ratified, the guarantee of religious freedom was understood as protecting against discrimination or abuse by the state based on religion, but not as requiring favorable treatment of believers by the state. In particular, there is little evidence that the founders understood the free exercise clause to prescribe “religious exceptions” that would discourage believers from complying with neutral and general laws that restrict the rest of society. In the three years since Smith, more than 50 reported cases of free movement against religious groups and individuals have been resolved. As a result, more than 60 religious and civil liberties groups, including the American Civil Liberties Union, Concerned Women for America, People for the American Way, and the National Association of Evangelicals, joined forces to draft and support the passage of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act – or RFRA. .
